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In the context of social media, the question, ‘to what extent can the State exercise 
legitimate authority in regards to the imposition of regulation?’[1] is concerned with 
understanding the limits of State control and law-making capacity in regards to what 
is considered a legitimate use of regulating the use of social media.  In this context, 
this question represents a contribution to the age-old debate of State control versus 
personal freedoms and liberty.  This investigation is situated within the epistemology 
that has developed over a long period of time looking at the question of State versus 
individual freedoms, but differentiates itself by addressing a very contemporary 
phenomenon. 
 
There are many instances throughout the course of jurisprudential study where those 
have sought to discover the legitimate extent of State authority; certainly it is a 
central concern of political philosophy.  However, the contemporary context in which 
the question is raised here, is new and is crucial given the relatively short time that 
social media has undeniably become one of the defining characteristics of the 
modern, developed world.   
 
Fundamental to this question therefore, is an understanding of the nature of the 
alleged harms and the possible existence of an evidential link proving that social 
media actually causes those harms.  Without establishing some causal relationship 
between the two, how can one justify the imposition of regulation by the State?  The 
nature of these harms will be examined with a view to determine whether it is 
possible to assert with any degree of certainty, that there is a causal relationship 
between social media and the ills it is alleged to be causing. 
 
Given the rapid growth of social media and the pervasiveness in which the 
phenomenon now permeates into many facets of society in unique ways, it is very 
pertinent to understand how the law, through the coercive apparatus of the State, is 
and should be constructed when applied to social media.  These questions can be 
legitimately placed within the realms of jurisprudence since jurisprudence provides 
an avenue to explore the philosophical foundations of the existence of the State and 
State control.  The issue of State dominance has been at the forefront of many 
jurisprudential questions and many have written on the complex relationship 
between the citizenry and the State.  Jurisprudence, through its disciplinary links to 
the greater body of philosophy, enables us to explore the meaning of social media 
and to derive a general understanding of it using those principles.  It is only after a 
consideration of the philosophical is it possible to gain a better understanding of the 
metanarrative that underlies the foundation of law.  Without such an analysis it is fair 
to assert that all that law is, is an ad hoc system of reactive decisions without a clear 
sense of direction from whence we came or where we are going.  This is why 
jurisprudence has an extremely valuable part to play in the development of law in 
relation to this new technology. 
  
Regulation and the Harm Principle 
 Putting aside the purported benefits of social media for one moment, there is no 
shortage of evidence to highlight some of the problems associated with the use of 
social media.[2]  The types of harm that have been alleged to stem from social 
media can be viewed on a spectrum of minor to major affectation.  For instance, 
behaviours such as inattentiveness, lack of interpersonal skills, deterioration of 
relationships in the ‘physical world’, extending to the more severe forms of harm 
such as cyber-bullying, invasions of privacy, defamation, child exploitation, rape and 
even murder. Even if one accepts the Millsian conception of State coercion based on 
the harm principle,[3] there are a number of problems with the concept of ‘harm’ as it 
applies to social media.  The first of these problems relates to a shared 
understanding as to what actually constitutes ‘harm’. 
 
The concept of harm is, to some extent quite elusive and subjective on the basis that 
what one person considers ‘harm’ may be different to what another person considers 
‘harm’.  The harm principle is therefore open to a wide interpretation.[4] A second 
problem that exists relates to who determines what particular ‘harms’ would be 
subject to specific regulation.  Should this be open for the State to determine?  A 
third problem relates to contested claims that social media does not cause harm, and 
it must be proven that social media causes harm before it becomes the subject of 
regulation. Rather social media is merely a tool and is not inherently ‘harmful’ exists 
in so far as the whether it is appropriate that  whether that ‘harm’ is actually caused 
by social media in the first place.    There are certainly strong arguments that social 
media actually empowers individuals and groups and should be regarded as a 
platform for immense good within society. 
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[4] The ambiguity lies in the lesser consequences of what some might call ‘anti-social 
harms’ such as inattentiveness at the interpersonal level or using social media to 
withdraw from the physical world.  Can we label these minor social breaches ‘harm’ 
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